UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION UPON THE
EXTINGUISHMENT OF GROUND RENTS.
An Act relating to the Avtinguishment of Ground Rents, and
providing a means where Ground Rent has been exrtinguished
by payment or preswmnption of law,for recording such extinguishnment, and making the same binding and effectuaL P. L.
1897, page 149.
In the September number of the LAW REGISTER for 1896,
in discussing the case of Biddle v. Hoo-en, 120 Pa. 221, as to
the constitutionality of the Act of 1855, declaring that a
claim for arrears of rent by a ground rent landlord after twentyone years, was barred by limitation, we asserted on the
authority of Haines' Case, 73 Pa. 169, that the Supreme
Court could not enforce its own decree, because it professed only to take away the remedy and not to impair the
contract. Sharswood, J., delivering the opinion of the court,
said, that in such a case a court of equity could not interfere
to decree an extinguishment, as it would usurp the position of
a court of law and deprive the ground rent landlord of his
property without a trial by jury. If his property is thus
taken under the guise of public use, the Constitution of the
United States, the Constitution of his State, guarantee him a
trial by jury. If it is a question between the parties themselves, no court of equity can interfere to decree that the interest
of the landlord in the rent has been extinguished, still less
can it do so without his constitutional trial by jury, On June
14 th, 1897, the Legislature passed the Act entitled, "An
Act relating to the Extinguishment of Ground Rents, &c.,"
as follows:
SEcTIoN I. Be it enacted, &c., That in all cases in which a
ground rent has been or may be extinguished by payment or
by presumption of law, but no deed of extinguishment or
release thereof appears of record, it shall and may be lawful
for the owner or owners of the land out of which the said
rent issues, or any person interested, to apply by petition,
under oath or affirmation, to the Court of Common Pleas of
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the county, in which the land out of which the rent was reserved is situate, setting forth the reservation of the rent and
the name of the present holder or holders, owner or owners
of said rent, if known, and if not known, then stating the
name of the last recorded owner, and also the fact that said
ground rent has been extinguished, and the method or means
whereby it became extinguished, and asking for an issue to
determine the question of its extinguishment by a jury. Whereupon the court shall direct an issue to be framed, to try the
question whether said ground rent has been extinguished, and

shall make such order for giving notice to all parties to said
issue and all other parties interested therein, if any such exist,
as the court shall see fit, either by personal service, publication or otherwise.
SEC. 2. The issue to be framed, as provided by the first
section of this Act, shall be a real issue in the usual form, to
determine whether the said ground rent has been extinguished
by payment or by presumption of law, in which issue the last
known owner or owners of said rent shall be the plaintiff, and
the covenantor in the deed under which the ground rent was
reserved and the petitioner shall be the defendants; and in
case of a rent reserved by deed dated and recorded more than
twenty-one years before the filing of said petition, the burden
of proof shall be on the plaintiff to show that said rent is not
extinguished by payment or presumption of law.
SEC. 3. If upon the trial of the said issue, the verdict of
the jury shall be for the defendants, thereby establishing the
fact that said rent has been extinguished, by payment or presumption of law, the court shall, after entering fi.,al judgment
on said verdict, enter a decree declaring that said ground rent

is released, merged and forever extinguished, and a certified
copy of said decree, when duly entered, shall be recorded in
the office of the recorder of deeds of the proper county, shall
be indexed in said office in the name of the last recorded
owner or owners of said rent as grantors, and shall have the
same force and effect as a deed of extinguishment duly executed by the real owner of said rent and duly recorded in
said office.
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SEC. 4. At any time before final judgment, any person or
persons claiming by petition, under oath or affirmation, to be
interested in said rent, shall be admitted as parties plaintiff in
the issue, with the same effect as if made plaintiff therein on
the order of the court awarding the issue.
SEC. 5. Any party aggrieved by the judgment of the court
may appeal thereupon to the Supreme Court or Superior
Court as in other cases.
Approved June 14, 1897.
Whether this Act comes within the demand of the Supreme
Court in Haincs'sAp p'al. is a very serious question.
First of all, let it be remembered, that when the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania determined to sever the allegiance between the Proprietary Government of the Penns and itself, and
by the Act of 1779, known as the Divesting Act, proclaiming
the Sovereignty in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, sequestrated certain estates of the Penn family, it, at the same
time, by sections 8 and 9 of the same Act, assured to them
and their heirs forever the rents reserved from their private
estates : i Smith's Laws, 479.
No such Act, therefore, as the Act of 1897, could by implication repeal the Act of 1779, or effect the rents of the private
estates of the proprietary family, which rents really form a
large portion of the estates against which these statutes of
limitation have been directed. These ground rent landlords
not being American citizens could invoke the aid of the United
States courts. As the Supreme Court of the United States
finally decided in Butler v. Horzcitz, 7 Wallace, 258, that it
was unlawful even to change the kind of money called for in
a contract, it is hardly possible to conceive that any peculiar
doctrine of the Pennsylvania courts will have force or weight
in attempting to dispose of the entire estate in the rent.
In both the cases of Korn v. Brown, 64 Pa. 55, and Biddle v.
Hooven, 120 Pa. 221, the court said, that the Act of 1855,
providing that where there has been no claim or demand for
twenty-one years, an extinguishment will be presumed, was
constitutional, and that it did not impair the obligation of the
contract as between landlord and tenant, because it did not
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affect the estate in the rent or interfere with the contract,
but merely took away the remedy.
Therefore the estate in the rent was still in the owner or
landlord, and as no court has yet been induced directly to
impair the contract between the parties to that extent, the
owner of the land was left with a stain upon his title, and the
court was powerless to enforce the judgment.
In the case of Haines'sAppeal, we have seen, it was attempted
to complete the work started by the Act of 1855, and take
the estate in the rent from the owner and decree an extinguishment in favor of the owner of the land, on the authority
of the Act of 1868, declaring that in all cases in which
ground rents have been or may be extinguished by payment
or by presumption of law, but no deed of extinguishment or
release thereof shall have been executed, it shall and may be
lawful for the owner or owners of land out of which the rent
issues, or any person interested, to apply by petition to the
Court of Common Pleas; whereupon the court shall make
such order for giving notice, etc., and on due proof being made
of the truth of said petition, the said courts are authorized
and required to make a decree declaring that said ground rent
is released, merged and extinguished.

In Long-street's Executors, 7 Phila. Rep. 46o, the Court of
Common Pleas sustained this Act of 1868, holding that it did
not usurp the powers of the courts by compelling them to decide
a cause in a particular way ; that it did not impair the obligation of a contract, and that' it did not deprive the parties of
their right of trial by jury. In its opinion the court admitted
that it was an open question whether the Act did not deprive
the parties of a trial by jury, but finally decided that "due
proof" being made, the court could make a decree or send
such a case to a jury.
Afterwards, however, in the case of Raines's Appeal, 73 Pa.
169, this case was reviewed and the Supreme Court held
that the Act of 1868 was unconstitutional and that it did
violate the right of trial by jury. The court, Chief Justice
Sharswood delivering the opinion, added " No case has been
produced, and we think none can be, which goes the length
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which must be maintained here, that wherever there is an
outstanding claim which is barred by reason of lapse of time,
and, therefore, cannot be enforced at law, but which, nevertheless, is a cloud upon the title and prevents it from being
marketable, the possessor can invoke the aid of a court of
equity to remove the cloud and forever bar such claim or
encumbrance by a perpetual injunction." "We cannot strike
from the Act the words 'on due proof being made of the
truth of the'said petition' and insert other words which would
confine the jurisdiction to the case, where no evidence should
be produced which would save the act from its unconstitutional
operation."
It was intimated by the court, that if there had been a
provision giving the respondent a right to demand an issue the
argument against depriving the parties of a trial by jury might
be answered.
In hopes of relieving the situation, on the 14 th day of June
last the Act of 1897 was passed, providing, inter alia, that the
petitioner may ask for an issue to determine the question by a
jury; "whereupon the court shall direct an issue to be framed
to try the question whether said ground rent has been extinguished, and shall make such order for giving notice to all
parties to said issue, and all other parties interested therein.
if any such-exist, as the court shall see fit, either by personal
service, publication or otherwise."
This and the succeeding section, providing that the issue
shall be a real issue in the usual form, may be intended to
supply the trial by jury guaranteed to every citizen by the
Constitution of the State and the Constitution of the United
States; though, whether the provision that the owner of the
rent shall prove that the rent has not been paid, instead of the
usual custom that he who makes a claim should support and
prove'it, virtually reversing the ordinary rules of law held for
all time in all fiee governments, will be in accordance with
the Bill of Rights, " that trial by jury shall be as heretofore
and inviolate," shall be considered a fair trial, will be questioned.
We wish particularly to call attention to the point that this
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Act of I897 aims directly at the estate. It proposes to take
away the estate in the ground rent and give it to another, and
this without compensation, which deprives it of any consideration on the ground of public policy. As said in Palairet's
Appeal, 63 Pa. 485, where it was attempted to extinguish irredeemable ground rents by payment under the Act
of April 15, 1869, P. L. 47, taking the property of one person
and giving it to another is in no sense constitutional. It
might also be added that leaving to the discretion of the
court whether the notice to the owner of the ground rent
should be personal or otherwise, would bring it under the
condemnation in Gault's Appeal, 33 Pa. 94, "to divest
ownership without personal notice and without direct compensation is the instance in which a constitutional government
approaches most near to an unrestrained tyranny."
Recalling that in the case of the Act of 1855, both in the
case of Koril v. Browne, and Biddle v. Hooven, the court
expressly disclaimed an), intention to impair the contract
between the parties to the ground rent deed, but only to take
away the remedy, the case now under discussion is entirely
different. We are brought face to face with the question of
impairing the ubligation of the contract, declaring that the
owner of the land will continue to pay the rent as it falls due
or produce a deed of extinguishment between his landlord and
himself. Not only that, but the Act directly authorizes the
court to take the property of one man and give it to another
by ordering a decree that the rent has been extinguished by
lapse of time, in spite of all safeguards mentioned in the
ground rent contract to the contrary. Is the real issue "in the
usual form," when the owner of the rent is denied the privilege
accorded to the lowest criminal in a court of justice to hear
the charge against him and go free unless it be proved?
The Act of 1855 makes it a presumption of law, but the
court, in Biddle v. Hooz'en, said it meant a presumption of fact,
and if it meant more it would be void for excess; therefore
there can be no such thing as prPsumption of law under the
Act of 1897. To that extent Biddle v. Hooven overruled
Korin v. Browne.
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In conclusion, then, admitting the danger of such legislation,
that in the United States courts and nearly every State in the
Union, such Acts would be held unconstitutional as impairing
the obligation of a contract expressly provided in the deed.
that payment must be by deed executed between the parties,
also in spite of the objections against unusual interference
with methods of procedure to aid the owner of the land
to avoid the claims of a too indulgent landlord, and notwithstanding the owner of the rent is obliged to explain to
the jury that unsolved problem of mathematics, "proving
a negative," the Act of 1897 may be made to settle these
vexed questions.
Why it is better public policy to encourage the tenant who
may have a late receipt for rent in his pocket barring a statute
of limitation, yet who, by perjury against his landlord who has
nothing to show, can get the estate of another by a doctrine
of law at variance with former established principles, than to
insist that the tenant should get rid of the claim by paying
as in other transactions of life, is one of the mysteries of the
law of real estate in Pennsylvania.
This Act of 1897 can still be saved and rendered serviceable, provided it is admitted that there can be no payment by
presumption of law. ro that extent the court in Biddlc v.
Z-oovcn, we have shown, has practically declared the Act of
1855 unconstitutional and would apply against the Act of
1897, therefore there can be no binding instructions to the
jury to find for the owner of the land on that ground. This
reduces the case entirely to a question of fact between the
parties.
Finally, then, if the trial of the real issue be a trial before a
jury, in fairness and honor, the Act of 1897 may thus settle
questions so far eluding the various statutes and all the courts
to this day. Let the owner of the rent be served, and after
statement of his claim, with the evidence of both sides fairly
submitted to the jury, await the result. This will. at least,
bring a verdict as to the fact of the assertion of payment, and
either save the owner of the land from his negligence in losing
his deed or not recording it, or force him to pay his honest
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debt. Whether right or wrong, the owner of the estate in the
rent, will, at least, have the judgment of his peers.
Unless this Act of June 1897 shall be thus limited and such
legislation be restrained, as Chief Justice Sharswood insisted,
we can only mournfully repeat the language of the late Judge
Black in his dissenting opinion in Hole v. Rittenhouse, 2 Phila.
Rep 417. " This case is important in its principle, so curious
in its history, and so alarming in its result, that I feel bound
to put on record a brief statement of my own views."
" The judgment now about to be given is one of' death's
doings.' No one can doubt that if Judge Gibson and Judge
Coulter had lived, the plaintiff could not have been thus
deprived of his property; and thousands of other men would
have been saved from the imminent danger to which' they are
now exposed of losing the homes they have labored and paid
for. But they are dead; and the law which should have
protected those sacred rights has died with them. It is a
melancholy reflection that the property of a citizen should be
held by a tenure so frail. But ' new lords, new laws' is the
order of the day. Hereafter if any man be offered a title
which the Supreme Court has decided to be good, let him not
buy if the judges who made the decision are dead; and if they
are living let him get an insurance on their lives; for ye know
not what a day or an hour may bring forth."
The majority of this court changes on the average every
nine years, without counting the chances of death and resignation. If each new set of judges shall consider themselves
at liberty to overthrow the doctrines of their predecessors, our
system of jurisprudence (if system it can be called) would be
the most fickle, uncertain and vicious that the civilized world
ever saw. A French Constitution, or a South American
Republic, or a Mexican Administration, would be an immortal
thing in comparison to the short lived principles of Pennsylvania law. The rules of property which ought to be as
steadfast as the hills, will become as unstable as the waves.
To avoid this great calamity, I know of no resource but that
of stare decisis. I claim nothing for the great men who have
gone before us on the score of their marked and manifest
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superiority. But I would stand by their decisions, because
they have passed into the law and become a part of it-have.
been relied and acted on-and rights have grown up under
them which it is unjust and cruel to take away."
Richard Al

Cadwalader.

NOTE.-The inconsistency of the Legislature is singularly illustrated in this class legislation against the owner of an estate in a
ground rent, by reference to the Acts of May
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1864, P. L. 914,

and May 26, 1897, P. L. iox.
These Acts insist upon the collection of the purchase money with
interest due the Commonwealth on unpatented lands. The statute
of limitations cannot be pleaded against the Sovereign; the Act of
1897 directs that the Surveyor-General shall make a descriptive list
of all unpatented lands, and transmit to the Prothonotaries of the
different Counties, who shall enter the amounts as liens against the
lands and enforce the collection of the same.
Some of these claims date back to the Divesting Act of 1779.
All are very old, and it is probable that the legal proceedings will
ruin many, without convincing them that their debts have not in
some way been paid.
The only difference between the claims due the Commonwealth
and the owner of an estate in a ground rent, is that the ground rent
landlord has a covenant of the tenant under seal and duly recorded,
while the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has only an implied
promise to pay. The Legislature of the State has prescribed exactly the opposite course of legal prccedure, which makes it
difficult to understand the justice, or the question of public policy.

